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Case No. 20813 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Florence, claims one third of a real estate com-
mission paid to the defendants for the sale of certain multiple unit 
real property on the basis of an express oral contract with the defend-
ant Iverson and also on the basis that there is a custom and trade 
practice in the real estate brokerage profession to divide fees equally 
when more than one broker is involved in a real estate sales project. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The defendants James R. Gaddis and Gaddis Investments were 
dismissed out on summary judgment on the grounds that they were not a 
party to the subject oral contract. That dismissal was not appealed. 
The defendant DeWayne Iverson moved for a summary judgment and the 
trial judge granted that motion. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintff-Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court 
order dismissing this suit as to the defendant Iverson. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In August 1983 James R. Gaddis approached Plaintiff for 
the purpose of obtaining all the information plaintiff had regarding 
certain types of income producing property a client of the defendant 
Gaddis Investment Company wanted to acquire. 
Plaintiff responded to the aforesaid inquiry that he had no 
clients that had such property but he knew of a real estate salesman 
who did. 
Plaintiff then requested such information from the defendant 
DeWayne Iverson who said that he would not disclose the identity of 
his clients owning such property unless the broker requesting the in-
formation agreed in writing to divide any commission on the contemplated 
purchase three ways. Plaintiff obtained such a letter from the defend-
ant James Gaddis and asked for and received an assurance from the 
other defendant that there would be a three way split on any real estate 
commission that was earned as a result of any sale effected as a result 
of the joint efforts of Gaddis Investment and DelMyne Iverson. 
The client of the Defendant James R. Gaddis and Gaddis 
Investment referred to above purchased certain property for over 
$4,500,000 and the owner thereof paid a real estate commission of 
$200,000. 
There is an implied agreement arising from the custon and 
trade practices in the real estate brokerage profession to divide fees 
equally when more than one broker is involved in a real estate sales 
project. Defendants refused to divide the commission with plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
1. Whether or not there was an enforceable oral contract. 
2. Whether there was a genuine dispute factually as to the 
above issue and of the existence of a custom and trade practice in 
the real estate brokerage business to imply a contract to divide com-
missions equally when three brokers were involved. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is error for the lower court to grant a motion for 
summary judgment when there is a genuine dispute as to material facts. 
ARGUMENTS 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WHEN THE RECORD SHOWED THAT THERE 
WAS A GENUINE DISPUTE WITH RESPECT TO TWO 
MATERIAL FACTS, TO WIT: (1) WHETHER THERE 
WAS AN ENFORCEABLE ORAL CONTRACT (2) WHETHER 
THERE WAS A TRADE AND BUSINESS PRACTICE TO 
DIVIDE REAL ESTATE COMMISSIONS EQUALLY UNDER 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
In the respondent's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment at page 3, his counsel states (par.7) "When brokers 
split commissions it is as likely that there will be an uneven division 
of the commission as that there will be an even division. One cannot 
say by community practice what the division will be (Deposition page 
43)". Even if the concession that an even division (appellant's 
position) is as likely as an uneven one (respondent takes position no 
division - even an unequal - is required) was not sufficient to bar 
summary disposition, as appellant claims it should, there was before 
the Court the affidavit of Bernard C. Fallentine, a licensed real 
estate broker of this State for over ten years that the custom even 
in the absence of a written agreement is to divide the commissions 
equally if more than two brokers are involved "in the absence of any 
agreement to the contrary". (R.79). 
This evidence which supports appellants claim certainly 
creates the type of dispute that requires an evidentiary hearing and 
precludes the granting of a motion for summary judgment. 
(1. Utah R.Civ.P. 56 (c); Hall v. Fitzgerald, Utah. 
671 P.2d 224, 226 (198371 
2. McBride v. Jones, Utah, 615 P.2d 431, 432 (1980). 
3. Gadd v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984). ) 
Respondent successfully urged the trial court to make 
an exception to the well settled rules of summary judgment on two 
grounds: (1) appeallants services were complete before he exacted 
the promise of respondent to share his commission whether it was the 
Karen Lee Apartments or any other that were sold to the "hot buyer" 
(R 62 and (2) the defendant Gaddis had been dismissed out and the 
respondent Iverson "stands in no different position than Gaddis in 
relation to plaintiff insofar as the claimed implied agreement is 
concerned (Deposition page 41-44)". (R 67). 
As for (1), it is factually not so. Appellant brought 
Iverson and Gaddis together after the conversation appellant had with 
Iverson when he delivered the letter of August 26, 1983 (R 69). This 
is very clear from the quotation respondent made from appellant's 
deposition (R 62) which occurred on the morning that letter was dated. 
"I said 'Great, take it to Gaddis and let him do what he wants with 
the Karen Lee'." At its strongest, the reference by respondent's 
counsel to "the morning of the 26th" created a dispute as to whether 
it took place on the 25th (as respondent concedes on the first line of 
R62) or the 26th. In any event the facts to establish a lack of con-
sideration (a defense which requires an affirmative pleading which was 
not made by respondent) are not conclusively established in the record 
so as to permit the granting of a summary judgment on that ground. 
As for (2), the positions of defendants at the time the 
respective motions for summary judgment were granted were as opposite 
as they could be. Gaddis' motion was based solely on the grounds that 
they were not parties to the oral contract which is the first basis for 
plaintiff's suit (appellant conceded such to be the case). As for the 
second basis, appellant was not then armed with an affidavit to 
establish the business custom and trade practice when the Gaddis motion 
was heard on February 12, 1985. When the Iverson motion was heard on 
May 2, 1985, the affidavit establishing the business practice was be-
fore the Court (R 79). 
CONCLUSION 
There is a clear and genuine dispute as to at least two 
material facts which should have pre-cluded the granting of summary 
judgment in this case, to wit: (1) whether there was a valid oral 
contract to divide commissions three ways (2) whether there was an 
applicable business and trade practice to divide real estate commissions 
chree ways under the facts of this case. 
The summary judgment granted respondent in this case should 
be vacated and the case tried on its merits. 
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of October, 198fi, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CALVIN K. FLORENCE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEWAYNE IVERSON, BRUCE E. 
HOLMES, HOLMES REALTY, a Utah 
corporation, JAMES R. GADDIS, 
GADDIS INVESTMENTS, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C84-5760 
Judge Dean E. Conder 
Defendants James R. Gaddis and Gaddis Investments 
hereby jointly move the Court under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure for summary judgment in their favor. The grounds 
for this motion are as follows: 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO ALLEGE AN 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN GADDIS AND PLAINTIFF 
1. Plaintiff's Complaint herein alleges an agreement 
whereby plaintiff was promised one third of any real estate 
broker's commission "that was earned as a result of any sale 
effected as a result of the joint efforts of Gaddis Investment 
and DeWayne Iverson." Plaintiff's Complaint, 1(8. The Complaint 
prays for judgment entitling plaintiff to his alleged share of a 
commission paid in connection with the sale of the Brittany 
Apartments* Plaintiff's Complaint, 1MI 10, 11. 
2. Plaintiff's Complaint fails to allege that defen-
dants James R. Gaddis and/or Gaddis Investments were a party to 
any such agreement. The complaint alleges only that "plaintiff 
asked for and received an assurance from said defendant [DeWayne 
Iverson] that there would be a three way split on any real estate 
commission that was earned as a result of any sale effected as a 
result of the joint efforts of Gaddis Investment and DeWayne 
Iverson." Plaintiff's Complaint, 1|8. The Complaint alleges only 
that defendant Iversoh, not defendants Gaddis, made this promise 
to plaintiff. 
PLAINTIFF HAS ADMITTED THAT HE J1AD NO 
AGREEMENT^WITH GADPfs WITH RESPECT 
TO THE BRITTANY APARTMENTS 
3. Even assuming an agreement between plaintiff, on 
the one hand, and defendants James R. Gaddis and/or Gaddis 
Investments, on the other hand, such agreement provided only that 
defendants Gaddis and Iverson would split the real estate commis-
sion with plaintiff if Gaddis' client purchased the Karen Lee 
Apartments. Gaddis' client never purchased the Karen Lee 
Apartments. Gaddis' client purchased the Brittany Apartments and 
plaintiff has not alleged an agreement between Gaddis and plain-
tiff with respect to the Brittany Apartments. 
4. The only basis for an agreement between plaintiff, 
on the one hand, and defendants Gaddis, on the other hand, is 
found in a letter marked as Exhibit 1 to the deposition of 
plaintiff: 
Q. Do you have any agreement with Mr* Gaddis 
other than this agreement that is contained 
in Exhibit 1? 
A. No. 
Florence Depo., 12-13-84, at 29. Copies of the relevant pages of 
this deposition, along with Exhibit 1, are attached hereto for 
the Court's convenience. 
5. Plaintiff has admitted that his agreement with 
Gaddis related solely to the Karen Lee Apartments: 
Q. So the purpose and reason for Exhibit 1 
was to insure that once Mr. Iverson disclosed 
the name of the Karen Lee Apartments, that 
Mr. Iverson and you would deceive a commis-
sion if the sale of those apartments was 
consummated. Is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And nothing else; correct? 
A. As far as I know. 
Id., at 30-31. 
6. Plaintiff admitted that he did absolutely nothing 
with respect to the transaction regarding the Brittany 
Apartments: 
Q. With respect to the'Brittany Apartment 
transaction, you did absolutely nothing. 
Isn't that a fact? 
A. I was never requested to do so, no. 
Q. So The answer is no? 
A, The answer is no. 
Id., at 46. 
This motion should be granted because plaintiff has 
failed to allege that defendants Gaddis are a party to the agree-
ment sued on. Moreover, plaintiff is now precluded from making 
such an allegation because he has admitted that he had no agree-
ment with Gaddis with respect to the Brittany Apartments. The 
only agreement produced and testified to by plaintiff relates to 
the Karen Lee Apartments; a property that was never sold and for 
which commissions were never paid. 
This motion is based upon the files and pleadings 
herein. Because it is relied on herein, defendants Gaddis hereby 
request that the deposition of plaintiff Calvin Florence be 
published for purposes of this motion. 
DATED this lty day of January, 1985. 
ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR 
By 1(M% '2* /^4-
Thomas B. Green 
Attorneys for Defendants 
James R. Gaddis and 
Gaddis Investments 
EARL D. TANNER #3188 
EARL D. TANNER, JR. #3187 
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2021 
Attorneys for Defendant Iverson 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CALVIN K. FLORENCE, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
DEWAYNE IVERSON, et al., ] 
Defendants. 
1 MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 Civil No. C84-5760 
(Judge Dean E. Condor) 
Defendant DeWayne Iverson, through his counsel, hereby 
moves the Court, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, for entry of summary judgment of no cause of action ir 
his favor, and against plaintiff Calvin K. Florence. 
This motion is based upon the file herein, the 
deposition of the plaintiff, and the Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed herewith. 
DATED this 16th day of April, 1985. 
EARL D. TANNER 
EARL D. TANNER, JR. 
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER 
A F F I D A V I T 
STATE OF UTAH 
'jss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
BERNARD C. FALLENTINE, being first duly sworn upon his 
oath deposes and says: 
1. He is a real estate broker licensed by the State of 
Utah and has been continuously for the past ten years. 
2. There is a custom and practice among real estate 
brokers in the State of Utah to equally divide any real estate 
commissions paid by the sellers or buyers of real estate even in 
the absence of any written or oral contract to that effect but 
subject to modification by any such contracts. 
3. If more than two real estate brokers are involved in 
real estate sales the commissions are equal shares for all who are 
involved in the absence of any agreement to the contrary. 
Dated this / * day of l l f l t Z g ,1985. 
rJ^UL, 
IRNARD C. FALLENTINE 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this / ^ ' day of 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission expires: Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
EARL D. TANNER #3187 
BRAD L ENGLUND #4478 
TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2021 
Attorneys for Defendant Iverrson 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt lake County Utah 
JUN27 1985 
?3rti Diet. Court 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CALVIN K. FLORENCE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEWAYNE IVERSON, et al., 
Defendants. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. C84-5760 
Judge Dean E. Conder 
Defendant DeWayne Iverson's Mo.tion for Summairy Judgment 
came on regularly for hearing before the Court on May 2, 1985; 
Earl D. Tanner appearing for defendant Iverson and Robert R. 
Hansen appearing for plaintiff. The Court having considered said 
motion, and being fully advised in the premises and good cause 
appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's objection to the 
proffer by plaintiff of a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment with accompanying affidavit be sustained as said 
documents were not timely filed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant DeWayne Iverson1s 
Motion for Summary Judgment dated April 16, 1985 be and the same 
is hereby granted; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all of the claims and causes 
of action against defendant Iverson asserted in plaintiff's 
Complaint dated September 27, 1984 herein be and the same are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon their merits* 
DATED this ^ 7 day of June, 1985. 
RY THE COURT: 
Honorable Dean E« Conder 
District Judge 
ATTEST 
H DIXON HiHDLSY 
